Even before the war, a trend towards new alignments emerged to complement the United States’ diminished role.
Pakistan has emerged as a prominent player in the effort to end the crisis.
The South Asian country has been a key piece in Saudi Arabia’s strategy to diversify its security network and move away from exclusive reliance on Washington.
Regardless of how the conflict concludes, Israel will continue to hold its position as the dominant military power in the region.
Even though the Iran war seems unlikely to attain Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s military objectives, the past thirty months have demonstrated Israel’s intelligence capabilities.
Iran’s strategy has focused on its survival. That approach has worked well, but will significantly reduce Tehran’s capacity to project power and support its regional allies for some time to come.
Nevertheless, Iran is set to emerge in a more politically powerful position, even if it takes considerable time to recover militarily and economically.
The Islamic Republic has proved it can and will control the Strait of Hormuz. It has also shown the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, that they are susceptible to Iran’s drone and missile power.
Yet, the damage to those weapons in this war leaves Israel unchallenged, and Israeli leaders have had their appetites whetted for border expansion and projecting their power throughout the region.
That is what we’re seeing in Lebanon and Syria, and it manifests as well in the statements of hostility Israeli leaders frequently make toward Qatar and, more directly, Türkiye.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a defence agreement in September, strengthening their alliance.
This is why the meeting last week in Islamabad of the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt, last week was so significant.
Though little has come of the talks, Islamabad has not limited its efforts to these convenings. It has also worked with China to develop a proposal to quiet the bombs and reopen traffic in the Mideast.
The five-point proposal they put forward to end the American-Israeli war has not yet made a significant impact, although the fact that Donald Trump has not rejected it so far offers some hope.
Regardless, over time, it will be seen as a first step in a new era of international affairs in the region.
China has long been a major player in the Middle East, even if it is a much quieter power than the United States or even Russia.
Beijing has been working to increase its role gradually, as it demonstrated by helping to close the deal on the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement that has now been scuppered by this conflict.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has never been a major player in the diplomatic arena despite maintaining strong relationships across the Middle East. Islamabad is trying to change that.
These efforts might only bear fruit later, as Iran has no incentive to end the war until it gets guarantees that it will not be attacked again.
Nor does Tehran have any reason to trust the United States and Israel after twice being attacked while pursuing negotiations in good faith.
Israel, for its part, has every reason to continue the war until the Islamic Republic is broken apart, and the United States has committed itself to a war with no clear exit strategy.
But Pakistan is not only working to end the war, a task which may not yet be possible, but it will also require the help of more powerful and wealthier countries to succeed.
Islamabad is also eager to broaden its influence on the global stage.
Indeed, as tensions with its neighbour, India, escalate, Pakistan recognises that it must contend with New Delhi’s increasingly significant international standing.
That’s only one reason why the Sharif government has been motivated to take a leading role in peacemaking efforts.
The most immediate concern, of course, is that Pakistan shares a border with Iran. Instability along the border poses a direct threat. It also has the world’s second-largest Shi’a population after Iran.
Two dozen protesters were killed by security forces nationwide as they demonstrated against the war in early March, including ten who were shot while attempting to breach the US consulate in Karachi. The risk of unrest related to this conflict is very high.
It is important that last week’s meeting in Islamabad included Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt. This grouping creates a loose coalition of states with shared interests and perspectives on regional and international affairs, and they have been allies and partners for quite some time.
Pakistan is near enough to the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear power, and, with its extensive military experience and ability, it can offer Saudi Arabia some of the support it needs.
In exchange, Saudi Arabia can offer considerable support to Pakistan’s beleaguered economy.
Meanwhile, Riyadh and Islamabad have been courting Türkiye, trying to convince it to join a trilateral defence alliance.
Ankara, a regional power with lofty ambitions, has refused and isn’t likely to change its stance any time soon. But Türkiye is clearly willing to work with the others to coordinate regional strategy.
The driving force behind this growing alignment is Israel.
As the Turkish-Saudi-Pakistani alignment comes together and even brings in other partners, Israel is drawing closer to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India.
While it is fortunate that so far, competition between states in each bloc has not drawn allies into existing conflicts, that could change.
The Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish alliance, in which Egypt is now also playing a role, generally sides with states against insurgents.
This could conflict with Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, a breakaway republic from Somalia.
More explosively, it can also play out in Sudan, where Saudi Arabia and Egypt back the government while the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces.
We’ve already seen proxy clashes between Dubai and Riyadh in Yemen, although that ended quickly when the Emiratis withdrew.
There are several other key sites where these tensions can play out. This is what the changing face of the Mideast will look like in the wake of this war.
These conditions promise only uncertainty.
As always, Israel will be the wild card. There is little reason to hope these circumstances will cause Israel to pursue a more rational course.
It is far more likely that Jerusalem will, as it usually does, turn to increased aggression.
But if there was an “axis of resistance” before, Israel would find that the regional alliances it competes with are much better prepared to confront it.
And, even given the diminished pro-Israel sentiments in the West after the genocide in Gaza and the Iran war, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye will not be ignored and isolated like Tehran was.
Diplomacy, in such an environment, will be even more crucial than ever.
The only hopeful aspect is that, after everything that has occurred, it might still be possible for the international community to bypass American incompetence and interference.
Photograph courtesy of Wikimedia. Published under a Creative Commons license.
