At the end of February, the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, or CJNG, gained international attention through a series of coordinated attacks across Mexico in response to government forces killing their leader, “El Mencho.”
Across twenty states, police and soldiers were assaulted, businesses were set on fire, and roads were blockaded. While the use of extreme violence by the cartels is nothing new, this time it had a political feel.
Drug trafficking violence has plagued Mexico for decades, giving the country a dark reputation. But Mexico is a large country, and especially in recent years, many areas have become much wealthier and more stable.
Correspondingly, an increasing number of Americans have moved there, taking advantage of lower costs and the warmer climate, especially to cities like Puerto Vallarta on the western coast.
However, the cartels have never disappeared. CJNG has long possessed military-grade weapons, using RPGs to shoot down a military helicopter, attacking a US consulate, and, more recently, deploying drones.
But the February attacks did not only target the military and police. They also focused on destroying businesses, especially in the tourist-heavy city of Puerto Vallarta.
In the state of Jalisco alone, there were arson attacks against 80 Oxxo convenience stores, leading to up to 6,000 more closures across the country for the day.
This wasn’t just revenge. It was a show of power.
Along with its infiltration into government institutions and the establishment of zones it informally controls, CJNG’s use of insurgency tactics, urban combat strategies, and extreme violence places it in a Venn diagram with some terrorist organisations.
Although the two groups are not the same, it is interesting to compare their strategic and propaganda similarities with groups like the Islamic State (IS), which employs a mix of social media outreach to inspire terrorist attacks abroad while simultaneously controlling territory through a regime of terror.
I recently caught up with Malika Criezis, a researcher of extremist movements, to discuss how CJNG has impacted Mexico and is now expanding into Europe and the Middle East.
****
Spencer Sunshine: Most people hadn’t heard of Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) before these attacks. Can you briefly describe them and explain why they’re different from other cartels? Do they have more of a political leaning in particular?
Malika Criezis: Of all the Mexican drug trafficking organisations, the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación is one of the most powerful. Its use of extreme violence, the expansion of its drug trading capabilities, industry diversification, and semi-decentralised franchise structure have all fuelled CJNG’s rise to the top. In Mexico, it has exploited corruption and used coercion to attain a level of autonomy in some areas, while it has also expanded internationally.
In February 2025, the US Department of State designated CJNG as a “Foreign Terrorist Organisation.” (In the United States, there is no “domestic terrorist” designation, but there is one for groups based outside the country.) In fact, CJNG is one of seven Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs) that have now been given this terrorist designation.
Originally, CJNG emerged from the ashes of the Sinaloa Cartel-allied Milenio Cartel. After the Milenio leader was arrested in 2009, disagreements over his replacement caused fractures that split the group into two factions: La Resistencia and what would become CJNG. CJNG was ultimately victorious.
Under its new leader, Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes (“El Mencho”), CJNG’s power grew. The organisation expanded its territory, established operations abroad, and diversified its activities beyond drug trafficking. Since its founding, CJNG has had shifting alliances with other DTOs, including an alliance with Los Chapitos, a Sinaloa Cartel faction.
In terms of characteristics, CJNG has been known for its rapid expansion through hyper-violent strategies, a “unique franchise-based command structure,” a focus on sourcing fentanyl (it was one of the first major DTOs to pivot to the fentanyl market), and being one of the most aggressive DTOs in attacking the military, including with the use of drones.
CJNG also posts videos featuring extreme violence, such as execution videos, and these have gained wide popularity on Gore sites. But it also promises to provide stability for civilians in areas where it is dominant (although it is neither the first nor only DTO to do this).
This is an organisation that has also experienced transnational growth. For example, it expanded its cocaine, methamphetamine, and money-laundering networks into Europe by linking up with organised crime groups that act as subcontractors.
CJNG also has ties to the Middle East. According to Brookings, it established relationships with Turkish gangs in the 2010s and later developed connections with Hezbollah, although these are financial and not ideological relationships. CJNG also sends members abroad to facilitate its activities.
It will be interesting to see whether these transnational markets are affected by El Mencho’s death, or whether there are signs that CJNG is experiencing disruptions—something that changes in its European and Middle Eastern networks could signal. However, if business continues as usual, it will be a testament to the robustness of CJNG’s transnational franchise structure, which is designed to withstand decapitation of its leadership.
In terms of directly political goals, CJNG exercises strategic control through setting up conditions of “social sovereignty”, which Carolina Sampó, Nicole Jenne, and Marcos Alan Ferreira define as “ingrained, yet informal modes of governance” that “undermine the state’s authority.”
CJNG also often extorts with the “plata o plomo” (silver or lead) approach, offering law enforcement and government officials the choice between bribery or bullets. But silver is not always on offer, and sometimes CJNG goes directly to intimidation tactics, especially as it’s well known for its aggressiveness and “brazen violence”.
Spencer Sunshine: Trump designated CJNG as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). I was surprised, not knowing anything about the group. Is this designation based on political actions by the cartel, or merely an attempt to claim drug operations are political organisations for his administration’s own purposes?
Malika Criezis: There has already been widespread criticism of expanding the FTO category to include DTOs, not the least of which is that there already is a Transnational Criminal Organisation designation that applies to them.
If the FTO “material support” clause—which criminalises any financial support, no matter how small—is expanded to DTOs, it opens the door to people being charged for everyday things like buying produce, as many DTOs have now moved to exploiting farmers. These changes will provide an opening for the state to abuse terrorism laws.
Additionally, it risks not just “conflating crime and terror” but also disrupting the ability of US counterterrorism to focus on more dire threats posed by groups like IS and al-Qa’ida. Militarising the border would also negatively impact US-Mexico trade.
Designating DTOs like CJNG as terrorist organisations also does not address corruption within the ranks of law enforcement and politicians, nor the US side of the problem. Issues stemming from the US include the heavy demand for drugs and the ongoing problem of US weapons getting into the hands of Mexican DTOs.
Spencer Sunshine: The last decade has seen the rise of new kinds of illegal groups using new tactics—or at least ones not used on the same scale. Islamic State, for example, uses an innovative approach.
On the one hand, they have online propaganda that inspires single-actor attacks in the West, often carried out by actors not directly tied to the group. On the other hand, they developed a transnational state formation in the Middle East.
Obviously, in the past, terrorist groups have targeted businesses. Is the extent of the CJNG attacks similarly new, and is this approach similar to IS’s?
Malika Criezis: There are strategies and tactical approaches shared by DTOs like CJNG and terrorist groups like IS. While it’s useful to look at these, some care should first be taken to not collapse their differences. Ioan Grillo, a Mexico City-based journalist who has covered crime and drugs for 20 years, warns that:
Despite the Trump administration’s designation of the Jalisco cartel and other gangs in Latin America as foreign terrorist organisations, cartels certainly don’t control territory the way the Islamic State did in Syria and Iraq; Mexican security forces still go into cartel strongholds, and the government still sends teachers to schools, keeps the lights on, and collects garbage. But cartels do want a weak and corrupt state that they can bully — and for many years, tragically, they have had this in Mexico.
But what criminal and terrorist groups can do is learn from one another, and both must be innovative and adaptable if they wish to survive in the face of national and international pressure.
Like the Islamic State, CJNG maintains an online presence with the purpose of sharing propaganda videos, featuring hyper-violent executions of enemies, and maintaining recruitment efforts. Social media companies try to remove their content—just as they do with other DTOs and groups considered terrorist organisations—and they have to work around content moderation in order to stay online.
For example, both IS (and their supporters) and CJNG use emoji codes to avert censorship, as well as use propaganda to convey a complex set of narratives.
On the one hand, both are happy to centre brutality, such as hyper-violent executions: these messages are directed toward adversaries. But at the same time, they seek to present themselves as the “good guys” by offering themselves as an alternative to government corruption and showing that they can provide public services and keep things running.
This means that countering groups like CJNG and IS requires going beyond kinetic strategies like leadership decapitation and disrupting their networks. We must also consider the dynamics of their propaganda and the diverse array of narratives.
When it comes to attacks, operational capabilities, and recruitment, IS and CJNG have incorporated the latest technology, including drones and artificial intelligence. Both have also used improvised vehicles for battlefield combat; for example, DTOs use what are called “monstruos” or “narco-tanks”.
Although not unique to them, CJNG has used “narco blockades” when trying to impede government responses and other military operations—a tactic that was used during the most recent attacks.
Spencer Sunshine: This wave of attacks seemed to be a show of force, targeting businesses but with limited impact on individuals or even government buildings. Is this right? How many people have been killed? Is there a larger logic to this?
Malika Criezis: Yes, CJNG was seeking to demonstrate a public show of force and dominance, as well as express anger that El Mencho was killed. Over 70 people have died, including 25 members of the Mexican National Guard. If CJNG leaders can agree on a successor, the risk of CJNG fragmenting and the situation devolving into mass violence amidst another cartel civil war decreases.
However, if there are signs of discord at the top, or if a major figure wants to split off, things could destabilise quickly. Other possibilities, as ACLED’s Sandra Pellegrini points out, might include rival groups taking advantage of a destabilising moment for CJNG. Only time will tell whether their leadership succession proceeds smoothly and whether the organisation can withstand challenges from both state forces and other DTOs.
Photograph courtesy of Diógenes. Published under a Creative Commons license.
