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Beyond Nigel Farage


Britain’s Ethno-Nationalist Future

Instead of uniting the British right, Nigel Farage has awakened more radical forces that threaten to eclipse him.

Nigel Farage-Six Pistols mashup. Brick Lane, London.

It’s hard to think of another conservative who has had so much sway over the wider culture without being in government.

A year ago, Farage looked unstoppable, and a Reform UK government looked inevitable. Now it’s increasingly clear the populist party peaked too early, and now it’s in trouble.

Wracked by scandals over political donations, Farage lost his magic touch with much of the mainstream media in 2026. But what’s hurting him most is the perception among the radical right that he is just another Westminster politician.

Farage’s efforts to take over the Tory electoral coalition have faltered precisely because he brought in unpopular defectors from the Conservative Party. That move has undermined Reform UK’s anti-establishment claims. So has its pivot to Thatcherite orthodoxy,

Reform UK went from pledging to scrap interest on student loans to advocating £80 billion in spending cuts. The party’s think tank is quietly weighing up abolishing state pensions.

Further blurring the line dividing his party from the Tories, Farage has attempted to stay within the civic and cultural parameters of British nationalism rather than openly backing ethnic chauvinism. That’s why Restore Britain has been able to use aggressive social media campaigning to steal a chunk of nativist support from Reform UK.

Many right-wing normies still see Farage as the only man who can deliver the radical change they want. But the Tory 2.0 strategy has allowed Restore Britain leader Rupert Lowe to outflank him with his hard demand: “millions must go”.

This is surprising, given how much luck Farage has had as a conservative politician. Reform UK went from being a minor party breaking through in 2024 to the government-in-waiting in less than a year.

Farage’s personal profile among right-wing voters was crucial to this success. But it was the mass disaffection of Tory voters, first and foremost, that made Reform UK the leading party in British politics.

Now that the Labour government has new leadership in Andy Burnham, Farage is looking less like a future prime minister every day. This isn’t to say Reform UK is finished. Nevertheless, its prospects have dimmed considerably since its peak last summer.

Peak Farage

Farage has long walked along the edge of the mainstream.

Over 20 years, he has helped make anti-immigrant politics respectable, carefully avoiding going “too far”.

Now Farage faces real challenges from far-right opponents who want a fight about Islam and race, not just borders and sovereignty. His strategy of mainstreaming hard-right talking points doesn’t go far enough for many of Farage’s natural allies.

Tommy Robinson and Danny Tommo have reignited far-right street mobilisations in the UK. Robinson has led huge demonstrations in recent years, drawing a wide spectrum of right-wing protesters into one bloc.

Tommo organised Patriot Platform to take direct action against the arrival of asylum seekers by boat on the south coast. The emotive spectacle of migrants arriving in dinghies has given these protests some level of popular support in the country.

Reform UK has tried to distance itself from the spectacle of the Patriot Platform organising balaclava-wearing goons to block ports and roads in some towns. Meanwhile, Rupert Lowe has expressed sympathy with the self-described patriots, while stressing that the anti-migrant protests should be non-violent.

This is the closest Britain has come to a dual far-right formation since World War Two, bringing together an electoral party and street action.

It’s not a stable alliance due to internal contradictions and tensions.

The radical nativist right is gripped by disaster nationalism, the nihilistic yearning for destruction and suffering on a massive scale. Deportations are an end in themselves, because they inflict pain.

Some of the so-called ethno-nationalists talk as if they want a Khmer Rouge-style “year zero” revolution to wipe away the scourge of modernity. Thankfully, there is no English Pol Pot, and this isn’t Cambodia circa 1973.

By contrast, most of the ex-Tories in Reform UK want a rejuvenated British capitalism and believe wholeheartedly in Thatcherism. A kind of free-market utopianism has always driven the Farage project.

Reform UK is very much a gradualist organisation seeking to ensconce itself in Westminster and become the new conservative party of government.

Farage fans don’t understand that the battle to get into power is just the start. Once in government, Reform UK will face immense challenges, and the party is ill-equipped for power.

The implicit theory of change behind the Farage project is that Reform UK will win power at the ballot box and enact its agenda. This presupposes an instrumentalist view of state power, with no conception of public institutions’ agency.

Most of the left suffers from the same delusion: win elections, seize power, activate socialism. The problem is that the British state isn’t simply a passive or neutral entity which can be taken over through popular consent.

Reform UK’s failure was implicit from the start, for structural reasons. It’s really a top-down media operation routed through a start-up company. Its supporters have little space for democratic participation.

The party’s organic presence is real in terms of branches and local government.  However, it lacks the kind of civic associational life that sustained mass parties in the past, whether Conservative associations or Labour’s working-men’s clubs.

As a result, Reform UK was always going to have “soft” conditional support from many voters, making it vulnerable to outside shocks from rival parties. This is why Restore Britain has proved to be such a significant threat.

To be clear, Farage still has support from much of the right-wing media, particularly GB News and The Telegraph. He also has elite backing from financial oligarchs and international allies across Europe and the United States.

Britain may still end up with a hard-right government in 2029. It’s just that Farage will have to get very lucky to win a strong majority, which is much less likely without Keir Starmer running the Labour government into the ground.

Surprisingly, the Conservative Party has survived Reform UK’s rise. Kemi Badenoch sutured the party’s wounds and prevented the Tories from bleeding out.

As a result, some Reform-Tory pact looks more likely than a full Faragiste regime. Such a pact could doom Reform UK as a radical-right party, since Farage would end up as a junior partner to Kemi Badenoch, signing off on compromised policies.

The same could be true even if Farage becomes prime minister, with Badenoch as second-in-command. Because Reform UK is unlikely to win an outright majority, a pact with the Tories would be the only way for Farage to wield power.

The chances of such a right-wing government delivering what its radicalised voters want are very low. Farage remains untested and surrounded by unserious people.

In the end, the country would end up even more broken and divided, with the right blaming the left for its own political misdeeds.

Deporting migrants who arrived by dinghies may be a popular talking point on the campaign trail. But it will not reverse-engineer the country’s demographics.

For now, demands for “remigration” function as a class strategy for the neoliberal right to dismantle what’s left of the public sector and the welfare state. Going further would require the British right to declare war on the country.

It’s no coincidence that there is so much talk of “civil war” among conservatives and nationalists these days.

Mass deportations of millions of people would require an authoritarian state capable of serious violence to quell opposition and round people up. This is the miserable reality of white nationalist fantasy.

Life After Farage

Although Farage has failed to unite the right, someone may succeed where he has failed. So the most relevant question now is what comes after the Farage show.

In some interviews, Farage likes to brag that he contained the far-right by building UKIP as the dominant voice of Euroscepticism. The truth is that he redirected the energies of the far-right into a program of neoliberal nationalism.

Unlike its continental neighbours, Britain has never had a mainstream far-right party with serious electoral prospects. The British National Party got almost one million votes in 2009. But Nick Griffin never reached the heights of Marine Le Pen or Alice Weidel.

Yet the Griffinite argument about English ethnicity, which holds that mass deportations are crucial, has become part of the mainstream. Mainstream discourse is more right-wing on immigration today than BNP policy circa 2010.

Farage stole Griffin’s base as UKIP leader and rolled those votes into a broader coalition of disaffected Tories, militant libertarians and assorted conspiracist cranks. This coalition has been expanded and reorganised through Reform UK.

These elements remain critical parts of the Farage coalition. The difference now is that the white nationalist tendency is fighting for hegemony over right-wing discourse.

What’s certain is that the post-Farage right will be even more aggressive and reactionary than before. Something like a British Likud or an Anglo Alternative für Deutschland can’t be ruled out.

Future historians should note that Farage helped make this possible.

The AfD is a particularly relevant example for Farage, who has appeared at their rallies and events in Germany numerous times over the years.

Nigel Farage wanted to revive Britain’s fortunes through radical free-market nationalism. Instead, he damned the country to a bleak present and an even darker future.

Photograph courtesy of Cory Doctorow. Published under a Creative Commons license.